Botswana and Zimbabwe have been acclaimed as being on the vanguard of the demographic transition in sub-Saharan Africa. This paper examines the comparability of the CPS and the DHS data for each country and finds that part of the observed decline in aggregate fertility rates in both countries can be attributed to differences in sample composition. Women of the same cohort tend to be better educated in the second survey relative to the first. This fact explains part-but not all-of the observed fertility decline; for example, it appears to account for up to half the observed decline among women age 25-34 in 1984 in Zimbabwe.
information collected in BFHS-I, the second wave collected detailed information on maternal and child health, breast-feeding, and contraceptive histories (Botswana Central Statistics Office 1989) .
Two similar surveys were conducted in Zimbabwe during the same period. The CPS, called the Zimbabwe Reproductive Health Survey (ZRHS), was carried out in 1984 by the Zimbabwe National Family Planning Council (ZNFPC) in collaboration with IRD and covered 2,574 women (Zimbabwe National Family Planning Council 1985) . In 1988, the Central Statistical Office and IRD implemented the Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey (ZDHS) which covered 4,201 women, a substantially larger sample (Zimbabwe Central Statistical Office and Institute for Resource DevelopmentlMacro Systems Inc. 1989) .
Although in most respects the 1984 and 1988 surveys in each country are broadly comparable, there is a key difference between them that may be important for a study of fertility. In the 1984 surveys, each woman was asked about children whom she had borne (living at home and away) and those who had died. In the 1988 surveys, however, after eliciting that information, the enumerator asked each woman to provide a complete birth history covering every child. If there was a discrepancy between the number of birth history entries and the original tally of children born, the enumerator was instructed to reconcile the difference. 3 This caveat notwithstanding, these data offer a unique opportunity to examine the dynamics of fertility change in Botswana and Zimbabwe. In particular, they afford the researcher the luxury of being able to cross-check estimates for consistency without having to make strong assumptions about the underlying data-generating process. There can be little doubt that the availability of these surveys already has had a substantial impact on the understanding of demographic processes in southern Africa; as additional data become available at the microlevel, further analyses along these lines presumably will add to this understanding.
The aim of this paper is quite simple: we wish to determine the extent to which the observed dramatic decline in fertility in Botswana and Zimbabwe reflects reality, as opposed to differences across the surveys. We tum next to the evidence. Table 1 presents some summary statistics regarding fertility and sample composition from the four surveys: the 1984 ZRHS, the 1988 ZDHS, the 1984 BFHS-I and 1988 BFHS-II.4 The story they tell is fairly well known.
THE EVIDENCE
The total fertility rate (TFR) in Zimbabwe was estimated to be about 6.5 in 1984, and declined by one child to 5.5 by 1988. The average woman had borne 3.4 children according to the 1984 survey, and almost half a child less, 2.95, in the 1988 survey. Completed fertility, as measured by the number of children ever born to women age 45-49 fell from 7.5 in 1984 to 6.9 in 1988. This finding suggests that much of the decline in fertility has been concentrated among younger women.
These declines have occurred in the context of rising child survival rates as well as increasing knowledge and use of modem contraceptives ( Table 1) . Knowledge of modem methods is virtually universal in Zimbabwe today, and the usage rate among all women (both married and unmarried) has risen by almost 20%, from 23% in 1984 to 27% in 1988. These increases probably reflect both successful family planning and public health programs (Boohene and Dow 1987) as well as broader social changes that have taken place in the country since Independence in 1980. 5 Massive spending on social services by the government is surely responsible in part for this change," and Zimbabwe has registered very impressive successes in increasing access to both the health care system and public education. Between 1980 and 1986, for example, primary school enrollment ratios rose by more than 40%. The vast majority of the people of Zimbabwe were excluded from secondary schools prior to Independence; at that time, only 8% of eligible children were enrolled. By 1986, these enrollments had increased almost sixfold to 46%. The number of tertiary students tripled during the same period and, unlike students in many developing countries, the majority (more than 70%) specialized in education, science, and teacher training (UNESCO 1986). These increases are also reflected in the demographic surveys; in 1984 the average woman had 4.9 years of schooling, whereas by 1988 she had over six years. Taking a longer perspective on fertility, however, there appear to be some puzzles. According to census data, the total fertility rate in Zimbabwe declined from 6.7 to 5.6 between 1969 and 1982; then it rose to 6.5 in 1984 and fell back to the 1982 level by 1988.
Apart from young women (age 15-19), age-specific fertility rates in 1982 and in 1988 are very close, whereas those in 1969 are substantially higher for every age group. This fact would be consistent with a decline in fertility during the 1970s and a leveling off in the 1980s.
Estimated age-specific fertility rates based on the 1984 survey, however, are rather different. They are higher than the 1982 and 1988 estimates for all women under 40, and, in fact, are 40% higher for women age 35-39. For older women, the reverse is true. On the basis of the 1984 survey, estimated fertility rates of women age 45-49 were only one-third of the comparable estimates in both the 1988 and the 1982 data sets.
It is generally thought that census data tend to underestimate fertility because women are less likely to recall births that occurred several years previously, especially those which involved early mortality. By now, many potential indirect methods have been developed which seek to adjust fertility (and mortality) data to account for recall error. The Brass et a1. (1968) P/F method has been applied by World Bank (1989) to evaluate the internal consistency of the four data sources. They argue that fertility indeed was underreported substantially in the two censuses and they thus calculate adjusted fertility rates (which are reported in Table 2 ). According to these adjusted data, the "national total fertility rate was close to 8 in the late 196Os, .... it then fell to around 7 by 1981/82, to around 6.5 by 1983/84 and to an average of 5.7 around 1986"7 (World Bank 1989, Volume 2:6; also see Mhloyi 1988 ). Researchers and policy makers therefore have concluded that there is evidence for significant fertility decline in Zimbabwe during the 1980s.
Turning next to Botswana, according to the 1981 Census, the total fertility rate was about 7.1; it declined to 6.5 by 1984 (according to the first wave of the BFHS) and collapsed to 5.0 by 1988 (BFHS-II). If these data reflect reality, then fertility has declined by more than 25% in only seven years and much of this decline is also concentrated in the later 1980s. Furthermore, as in Zimbabwe, the number of children born to the average woman declined by almost one-half child (from 3.1 to 2.6) and the completed fertility rate dropped by more than one child from 6.9 to 5.8 suggesting that the reductions in fertility are also concentrated among younger women. (For a discussion and an economic explanation of fertility change in Botswana, see Rutenberg and Diamond 1993.) The Botswana Maternal Child Health/Family Planning Unit was formed in 1973 within the Ministry of Health, but public investment in family planning grew fastest in the 1980s, especially after 1984, when the first BFH survey was fielded. The evidence suggests that these investments have had a high rate of return. Knowledge of contraceptives has increased by 50%: in 1984 about two-thirds of women knew about modem methods, and by 1988 that proportion had increased to 95%. As in Zimbabwe, knowledge of modem methods had become virtually universal by 1988. Use of these methods increased even faster, almost doubling from 16% to 29% during the four years between the two BFH surveys. School enrollment rates also rose during this period," and this fact is reflected in the two surveys: the average woman had 4.4 years of schooling in 1984 and 5.4 in 1988, placing her slightly below the average Zimbabwean woman.
All of this evidence suggests that fertility has declined dramatically in both countries during the four years between the two surveys. Thus, several authors have heralded the onset of the (long-awaited) demographic transition in sub-Saharan (or at least southern) Africa. Yet the final reports for both the ZDHS and BFHS-II recommend caution in taking these declines at their face value (Botswana Central Statistics Office and Institute for Resource Development/Macro Systems Inc. 1989; Zimbabwe Central Statistical Office and Institute for Resource Development/Macro Systems Inc. 1989). Several reasons have been cited, which suggest that it would be prudent to follow their advice.
Recall that the 1984 surveys collected summary information on the number of children ever born, whereas the 1988 surveys first asked each woman the number of children ever born and then obtained a birth history on each child. One might expect the birth history method to result in less underreporting but it has been argued that, in Africa, birth histories tend, in fact, to result in lower estimates of fertility (Government of Kenya and Institute for Resource Development/Macros Systems, Inc. 1989). It is not at all clear why this should be so (van de Walle and Foster 1990) ; it is plausible that high-parity women suffer from fatigue and so truncate their birth histories (and thus reduce the total number of children born) or they may just get confused as they enumerate all of their children. Some slippage in the birth histories has also been noted: respondents (or enumerators) appeared to misclassify . . children as older than age 5 and thus did not complete the child health module (Arnold 1992; Rutstein and Bicego 1990) .
Furthermore, both demographic surveys collected information only on woman age 15-49 in each household. One might suspect that younger and older women would be misclassified as outside the admissible age range in order to reduce the interviewer's wotkload (Arnold 1992) . There is some evidence that this is a problem. In both the Zimbabwe surveys and the Botswana DHS, women's age distributions indicate considerable underrepresentation by young women? and also in the Botswana DHS. In the next section, we take a look at the evidence to determine whether other indications in the data might suggest prudence in inferring a time-series pattern from the two surveys. Table 3 presents the age-specific number of children reported to have been ever born to women in Zimbabwe (in the upper panel) and Botswana (in the lower panel). Column 1 is based on the 1984 survey; Column 3, on the 1988 survey. According to these numbers, fertility in Zimbabwe has declined significantly in every age group with the largest declines among younger women. In Botswana, significant reductions in fertility are registered for every age group, except the youngest. (In this group, fertility has not changed significantly and is in fact slightly higher in the second survey although this increase simply may reflect sampling variation.)
THE EVIDENCE-ANOTHER LOOK
On the basis of these data, one also might infer that women tend to complete their This inference, however, may be misleading because reported fertility for the next cohort of women (age 40-44 in 1984) actually declined during the four years between the surveys, from 6.3 to 5.8 in Botswana and from 7.0 to 6.9 in Zimbabwe. 10 Pointing out this fact in Botswana, van de Walle and Foster (1990) attribute it to misreporting and suggest that it reflects differences in the methods used to collect fertility data in the two sets of surveys.!! Because the anomaly arises in both countries, this hypothesis seems appealing.
The birth history information in the 1988 surveys is exploited next. We calculate the number of children each woman reported she had borne as of 1984 and set her age to the level it would have been in 1984. These estimates of her fertility by 1984, based on the 1988 data, are reported in Column 2 of Table 3 (labeled ZDHS 1984 for Zimbabwe and BFHS-II 1984 for Botswana). Columns 1 and 2, therefore, are estimates of the same thing: the average number of children born to a woman of a particular age (group) as of 1984. In an ideal world, these figures would be identical (apart from sampling variation).
On average, for women age 15-44 (in 1984) ,12 fertility is significantly lower in the 1988 survey relative to the 1984 survey in both Zimbabwe and Botswana. For example, comparing Columns 1 and 2, the 1984 Zimbabwean survey estimates fertility to be 3.1 children per woman in 1984 but only 2.8 at that time according to the 1988 survey. This difference accounts for 80% of the observed decline in the number of children ever born over the period 1984 to 1988. In Botswana, the difference between the estimates based on cohort adjustment (in Column 2) is (slightly) greater than the difference between the observed numbers of children ever born in the two surveys. This difference is due to much lower estimates (based on the 1988 data) among women age 15-19 and 35-39 in 1984. There are several possible explanations for these differences. Recall that methodology differed between the two surveys and that there is some evidence young and old women were underrepresented in the samples. Perhaps the most obvious candidate is recall error: it is standard practice in demographic studies to treat this sort of difference as an indicator of recall error. In essence, this is a key idea underlying the P/F method for adjusting retrospective fertility data with a single survey, as suggested by Brass et ai. 1968. 13 But might there be some other reasons for the anomalies in the estimates of fertility based on these surveys?
The Distribution of Education
We pointed out above that during the 1980s, Zimbabwe and (to a lesser extent) Botswana enjoyed spectacular growth in the educational attainment of their youths. This growth is reflected in the fact that the average woman in 1988 reported one more year of schooling than her counterpart in 1984. Even in the context of the rapid social change that took place in these countries, this strikes us as a large increase. In this subsection we attempt to determine the extent to which this increase reflects changes in the underlying populations. Table 4 reports educational attainment for cohorts of women in 1984 and 1988 in the two countries. Because sample sizes become quite small as we stratify on both age and education, we have aggregated the women into lO-year age groups: 15-to 24-year-01ds (left panel), 25 to 34 (middle) and 35 to 44 (right). Once again, estimates are reported for the 1984 and 1988 survey (first and third columns, respectively, for each age groupj.tFollowing the strategy used in Table 3 , we explicitly compare cohorts of women. Using the microdata from the 1988 survey, the age of each woman is set to its value in 1984 and estimates of educational attainment are reported in the middle column of each panel (again labeled ZDHS 1984 and BFHS-II 1984) . The education gap of one year for the average woman in the pairs of surveys is reduced to 0.7 years in both Botswana and Zimbabwe when we compare the same cohort of women (those age 15-44 in 1984); this difference remains significant.
Because education histories were not reported in the surveys, completed schooling must be treated as time-invariant and thus will not accurately reflect education levels in 1984 for younger women. For older women who had completed schooling in 1984 (say women age 21 and over at that time) we can directly compare the educational attainment of cohorts of women across the two surveys. In the absence of adult education programs (as opposed to adult literacy programs), the numbers in the first two columns should be the same.
We thus expect large increases in educational attainment among young women: in Botswana, 15-to 24-year-olds register about one more year of schooling in 1988 than in 1984; in Zimbabwe, this difference is 1.7 years. For most people in both countries, schooling ends during the mid to late teens and so these increases, while large, are not t::l 1984 1984 1988 1984 1984 1988 1984 1984 1988 ., Very few women attend school beyond their early twenties, so rapid growth in educational attainment among older women would be less plausible. In Zimbabwe, women who were age 25-34 (in 1984) report almost one-half year more schooling in 1988 than in 1984 and this difference is significant. The increase among women age 35-44 is not as large and is not significant." Fewer women in the 1988 sample report they had no education and more report they received some secondary schooling relative to the women in the 1984 surveys. For example, among women age 25-34,5% reported more than Form 2 schooling in the earlier survey, but in the later survey almost 50% more than that (7%) claimed to have stayed at school beyond Form 2. Among women age 35-44, 7% had Form 2 schooling or above in the earlier survey, and 9% reported this level in the later survey.
In Botswana, the pattern by age group is quite different. Younger women (25-34) report slightly more education in the later survey, but older women (35-44) report substantially more (over three-quarters of a year, on average). Only 2% of all women age 25-34 reported attending school beyond Form 3 in the earlier survey; in the later survey, among the same cohort of women, 3 1 / 2 times as many (7%) reported Form 3 or higher levels. For women in the 35-44 age group, the differences are even more striking: in the earlier survey, only 1% reported staying at school beyond Form 3, whereas some 6% reported more than Form 3 education in the later survey. I? In sum, then, in both Botswana and Zimbabwe, women in the 1988 surveys report significantly more education than those women of the same cohort in the 1984 surveys. Much of the increase in the average number of years of education in the 1988 survey reflects a shift in the education distribution from primary to secondary school. Whether this is because the women in the 1988 survey were better educated than those in 1984 or whether they simply reported themselves as being better educated, we cannot tell. What we can say, however, is that simple comparisons of aggregates based on these data may be quite misleading. Indeed, given the fact that education and fertility tend to be negatively correlated (see below), we suggest that it would be prudent to evaluate the evidence regarding dramatic decline in fertility in both countries with this caveat in mind.
Impact of the Shift in Distribution of Education on Fertility Decline
How much of the observed decline in fertility can be attributed to these differences? Table 5 reports the number of children ever born to women, stratifying on both age and education and again exploiting the fact that we can create quasi-cohort data by back-casting the 1988 survey. Given these fertility rates, we can calculate the average number of children born to women as reported in each survey, using the distribution of education for each cohort implied by the 1984 and 1988 surveys (presented in Table 4 ). These estimates are reported in Panel B in each half of Table 5 .
In the first row, we use the education distribution as reported in each survey. In the second row, we adopt the education distribution in the 1984 survey (adjusting for age in order to estimate the implied distribution in 1988). In the third row, the implied distributions based on the 1988 data are used. For Zimbabwe, we also use the implied education distribution based on the 1987 Intercensal Demographic Survey. IS Thus, by reading across the rows, we learn the extent to which fertility has declined for each age group of women, given the assumed education distribution.'? The first column for each group reports the predicted number of children ever born, using the 1984 fertility rates and the 1988 rates are used in the second column. The difference between the two is reported in the third column. For the first row, this is the decline as reported in the two surveys (without taking account of the shift in the education distribution). The fourth column displays the proportion of this decline left unexplained when the distribution of education is consistent across the two surveys; if none of the observed decline can be attributed to changing sample composition, then this proportion should be zero.
In Zimbabwe, among women age 25-34, more than half the observed decline in fertility across the two surveys can be attributed to differences in the distribution of education of this cohort, assuming the distributions implied by the 1988 survey; 20% remains unaccounted for when the 1984 distribution is adopted and 36% given the 1987 distribution. The shift in the distribution of schooling accounts for between 10 and 14% of the observed decline among women age 35-44 in Zimbabwe and between 20 and 27% for Botswana women of that age. For younger Botswana women (age 25-34) very little of the fertility decline can be attributed to changes in the sample composition.
There is no doubt that fertility has declined in both Zimbabwe and Botswana. However, what is in doubt is the rate of decline. Estimates based on aggregate data may be too high because they can be explained, in part, by the fact that the 1988 survey gathered information from women who were, or reported themselves as being, better educated than women in the 1984 survey. Without knowledge of the true distribution of education at each survey date, it is very hard to determine the magnitude (and significance) of fertility change in either country.
Reasons for the Shift in the Distribution of Education
There are several reasons why we might observe increases in reported education for the same cohort of women across each pair of surveys, even in the absence of a change in actual educational attainment. First, women may misreport their age: if cohort-specific education rates are to rise in a context of increasing education over time, younger women would have to report themselves as older than their actual age. Furthermore, to affect our comparisons of the pairs of data sources, the propensity to overreport one's age would also have to increase over time. Finally, as pointed out above, the age distributions in the pairs of surveys seem to be consistent with each other although younger and older women appear to have been mis-classified so that they were excluded from the survey. This mis-classification should not have affected the women in the 25-40 age range-the women on whom we have focussed here. Age misreporting therefore seems to be an unlikely candidate to explain the observed differences in education.
As women grow older, however, they may simply report themselves as better educated. Once again, if this propensity to misreport can explain the results above, it would have to be an increasing function of time. At first blush, this possibility does not seem unreasonable in a society with dramatically rising educational attainment: older women may seek to conform more closely to the average for the country. We remarked above that in Zimbabwe, where we have an additional source of information on education by cohort, there is very little difference between cohort-specific reported education in the 1988 DHS and in the 1987 Intercensal Demographic Survey.
What is the evidence in other countries? Unfortunately, as far as we are aware, no nationwide regularly repeated cross section data sources are available for any African country. Thus we rely on data from Taiwan and the United States. The Current Population Survey is collected annually in the United States; using the March waves from 1980 through 1990, we calculated the reported years of education for white men and women born in 1940 and in 1945; these are displayed in Figure 1 . For men, we find no evidence that reported education has risen in these cohorts. For women, there is some tendency towards upward drift, although the largest gap is only about a 3% increase in reported schooling. This difference does not come close to the magnitude of the change observed in Botswana or Zimbabwe.P?
Perhaps regression towards the mean will be more apparent in a more rapidly changing society. Figure 2 presents reported education for women in Taiwan based on a similar data source, the Personal Survey of Income Distribution, for the same period. Sample sizes are smaller than in the U.S. data and so we examine women born between 1940 and 1944 in addition to the 1945 to 1949 cohort. There is no evidence of consistent upward drift in reported education in these data; if anything, the trend appears to be downward." In the U,S. and Taiwanese data, reported education apparently does not tend to rise with age, at least to the extent observed in the Botswana and Zimbabwe data.
We tum next to data from Kenya. There, as in Botswana and Zimbabwe, a CPS was conducted in 1984 and a DRS in 1988. Women of the same cohort do tend to be better educated in the later Kenyan survey. For example, among those age 25-34 in 1984, the average woman reported completing 3.7 years of schooling in the CPS but 4.5 years in the 1988 DRS; for the 35-44 age group, reported years of education were 2.0 and 2.5 respectively. As in Botswana and Zimbabwe, the differences tend to be concentrated among the better educated: for example, in the 25-34 age group, 15% report completing Form 2 or 13.4 Rather than changes in reporting behavior by women, the differences in the surveys may reflect changes in the underlying population. It seems unlikely that mortality alone could explain all the differences: this explanation would imply not only extremely high mortality rates, but also differentials between the least educated and the better educated for which no evidence exists. Net migration abroad is also far too small to account for the observed differences.
Alternatively, there may be shifts in the population that are not captured adequately by the sampling scheme. In both Botswana and Zimbabwe, the sampling frames of the CPS and the DHS are based on the 1981 and the 1982 Censuses, respectively. If, as the frame ages, the more mobile are less likely to be included in the samples, then given the overwhelming evidence that the better educated are more mobile, then we would expect the education of the same cohort to be lower in the second survey. Yet we find exactly the opposite. Furthermore, net migration tends to be out of the rural sector into urban areas; thus the education differentials should be negative in the rural areas but positive in the urban areas. There is no evidence that this is true either in Botswana or in Zimbabwe. For example, among women in Zimbabwe age 25-34 in 1984, reported education of the average urban woman was 6.3 years in the earlier survey and 7.1 in the later survey; among rural women, reported educational attainment was 3.2 and 4.2 years in the two surveys. In the later survey, the lower levels of cohort-specific fertility, as of 1984, also persist in both the rural and the urban sectors. Stratification on region leads to the same conclusion in terms of both education and fertility.22
In order to update the census-based sampling frame, for all four surveys a new listing of households was drawn up in each cluster and then households were randomly drawn from those listings. One possible explanation for the education differentials across the pairs of surveys is that the drawing was not random. Secondly, the listings may not have been complete, with better constructed dwellings (where the better-educated live) being more likely to be included in the samples.> If this is a widespread problem, then as frames are updated there should be discrete changes in the underlying "population" from which the sample is drawn. Furthermore, the education drift should be common across cohorts. Figures 1 and 2 provide no evidence for this phenomenon in either Taiwan or the United States: in fact, in each figure the changes in education for the pairs of cohorts tend to be inversely correlated with one another. Unfortunately we cannot determine whether an explanation along these lines can explain the differences between the pairs of surveys in Botswana and Zimbabwe.
Apparently there is no simple explanation for the differences in the sample characteristics across the pairs of surveys in Botswana and Zimbabwe. We do find, however, a similar pattern in the Kenyan CPS and DHS-but not in national samples for the U.S. or Taiwan, Explaining these differences strikes us as an important and complex issue, especially in the context of rapidly changing socioeconomic environments.
Changes in the Determinants of Fertility Outcomes
We have argued that comparing levels of fertility outcomes in the 1984 and 1988 surveys is not straightforward. Furthermore, indirect methods that fail to take into account the differences in the sample compositions may lead to misleading inferences about the dynamics of fertility change in Botswana and Zimbabwe.
Demographers also are interested in the determinants of fertility outcomes and, in particular, the relationship between education and the number of children ever born to a Woman. If differences across the pairs of surveys do not reflect changes in reporting behavior, but rather differences in sample composition, it should be possible to trace out changes in the effects of education on fertility during the 1980s. This is because sample composition differences should not bias estimated education effects. Thus it may be reasonable to assume that these effects will be comparable across the surveys, at least within cohorts.
Next, we examine this assumption in order to delve a little more deeply into potential sources of differences between the pairs of surveys. Fertility estimates for women in 1984 based on the birth histories recorded in 1988 are reported in the middle column of each group in the second panel of Table 5 . These are exactly the same estimates as presented in Table 3 except that now they are stratified on both age and education.
One might expect that as women recall beyond the previous five years, their memories dim and they fail to enumerate all the births. Estimates of fertility, therefore, should be lower in the middle column (recalled for the period prior to 1984 but reported in 1988) than in the first column (recalled in 1984). The patterns in Zimbabwe are quite intriguing. Consider first women age 25-34. Those at the bottom of the education distribution certainly do report fewer births.> But women who have completed at least primary schooling report more births.P A remarkably similar pattern emerges for older women: those with no education report one child less on average (a significant difference) and it is only women who have more than Form 2 schooling that report more births. Why would better-educated women systematically report more births in the 1988 survey?
We can only speculate on this question. It may be that better educated women tend to place events farther back than those with little education. This seems unlikely, however, and the evidence in Becker and Mahmud's (1984) Bangladesh validation study suggests no relationship between education and extent of back-casting.
A more likely candidate, perhaps, lies in differences in the survey design: in the second survey, women were asked to complete an entire birth history, whereas in the first survey they reported only the number of children born (alive and dead, by gender). It may be that the birth histories prompted better educated women to recall more events or those women may have reported children born after 1984 as born before then. 26 On the other hand, it may be that less educated women failed to recall detail on every live birth and so revised downwards their number of children ever born. Without more evidence, we cannot distinguish the hypotheses.
To clarify the implications of these differences for inferences about the changing effects of education on fertility in southern Africa, Table 6 presents the data slightly differently. The estimated effect on the number of children ever born to a woman of her highest level of educational attainment is reported for each age cohort (controlling for age and for whether the woman lives in an urban area). The first column of each panel is based on the 1984 survey data, the third column on the 1988 data, and the middle column on the 1988 survey, backcast to reflect age, fertility, and education as of 1984.
If the only differences between the pairs of surveys are due to sample composition, then the estimated education effects in the first two columns of each panel should be the same. They are not. Generally speaking, for all age groups and for both surveys, fertility and education tend to be negatively correlated, but the magnitude and significance of these correlations varies substantially between the surveys. In the 1984 Zimbabwean survey, for example, among women age 35-44, the fertility of women who have completed primary school or more is significantly lower than women with no schooling. By 1988, this difference is significant only for women with at least Form 2 education. Furthermore, the effect of education on fertility apparently was reduced considerably during these four years. 27 A comparison of these estimates with those based on the ZDHS, dated as of 1984, suggests that these inferences may be wrong. According to these data, women with at least Form 2 schooling had no fewer births than those with no schooling in 1984, but by 1988 the impact of education had increased dramatically. Furthermore, in 1984, on the basis of the 1988 data, women with fewer than seven years of schooling (had not completed primary school) had borne significantly more children than women of the same cohort with no education. Thus, in comparing the second and the third columns, we might infer that the impact of education on reducing fertility actually increased during the four years between the two surveys.
In Botswana the patterns are broadly similar, although perhaps less stark. Returning to Table 5 , women at the bottom of the education distribution tend to recall fewer births.s" and better educated women are inclined to recall more births (before 1984) in the second survey. The 7% of women at the top of the education distribution (more than Form 3) are an anomaly as they report far fewer children born before 1984 (in the 1988 survey) than they report in the 1984 survey. For example, women age 35-44 in the second survey report one child fewer born by the first survey date. The same point is abundantly clear in Table 6 . Consider women age 35-44 with at least Form 3 schooling. When the 1984 and the 1988 estimates are compared, the impact of schooling on reducing fertility rises dramatically but by comparing the estimates based on BFHS-II in 1988 and 1984, we find that all of this observed change appears to be due to sample differences.
The evidence indicates not only that comparisons of fertility outcomes based on the 1984 and the 1988 data might be misleading but also that comparisons of the determinants of fertility levels are complicated by differences between the pairs of surveys. The evidence also suggests that these differences do not reflect sample composition alone but that there is s Table 6 ... 
CONCLUSIONS
For many countries, the Contraceptive Prevalence Survey and the Demographic Health Survey are among the first nationwide demographic and socioeconomic data sets that have been made available for research at the primary level. There can be little doubt that the CPS and the DHS have made important contributions to the understanding of demographic processes in developing countries. In Botswana and Zimbabwe, it has only been with the collection and the release of these high-quality surveys that analysts have been able to examine the evidence regarding fertility decline in both countries.
It is clear that fertility has declined in both Botswana and Zimbabwe during the mid-1980s. What is less clear, however, is the magnitude of those declines. Comparisons of aggregate fertility estimates based on the 1984 CPS and the 1988 DHS data seemingly have resulted in overestimation of the rate of decline. This is because the decline can be attributed, in part, to differences in sample composition and survey methodology. Apparently the evidence for dramatic reductions in fertility during the mid-1980s in Botswana and Zimbabwe is not as strong as has been claimed previously. Thus population projections based on these estimates probably will tum out to be too low when results from the latest censuses are released.
In particular, the evidence presented in this paper demonstrates that women in the 1988 DHS tend to be better educated than women of the same cohort in the 1984 CPS. For example, among women age 25-34 in 1984 in Zimbabwe, between 20 and 50% of the observed fertility decline can be attributed to this fact; between 20 and 30% of the decline among women age 35-44 in Botswana can be explained similarly. For the other cohorts, the discrepancies between the surveys are smaller.
Because education is positively correlated with contraceptive prevalence, simple comparisons of aggregate data from the pairs of surveys may overestimate increases in prevalence. Part of the observed increases in child survival also might be attributed to differences in the surveys. In general, then, it is not obvious that we should base inferences about the magnitude of the time-series trend in demographic outcomes in Botswana and Zimbabwe on only the CPS and DHS data. As recommended in the final reports of both the 1988 BFHS-II and the 1988 ZDHS, prudence is needed in interpreting these data. It is likely that it will only be with the release of more socio-demographic data at the primary level that researchers and policy makers can hope to understand the complex process of social change taking place in southern Africa.
NOTES
1 This is especially true in Zimbabwe where data from two censuses usually are cited; the 1969 Census generally is recognized as having only limited value to policy makers in post-Independence Zimbabwe. There is also some debate about the quality of the 1982 census which was conducted soon after Independence.
2 At that time, IRDlMacro Systems was named Westinghouse Public and Applied Systems. 3 Unfortunately, on the data tapes used for this study, we are unable to determine whether such discrepancies arose or how they were resolved. An examination of these data may be a valuable exercise in and of itself. 4 The BFHS-I and BFHS-II estimates as well as the ZRHS estimates are weighted to account for different sampling proportions (of rural and urban households) included in the surveys; the ZDHS is a proportional probability sample. 5 Zimbabwe is often cited as having a very successful family planning program. Family planning services were introduced in Zimbabwe in 1953 and, since 1966 they have been an integrated component of the public health system. In 1984, family planning services were reorganized and the Zimbabwe National Family Planning Council was formed as a parastatal operating under the Ministry of Health.
6 In 1989, government spending as a proportion of GNP was high (40%); almost one-quarter of the public budget went to education, while the health sector received 7.6%.
7 The authors do not discuss the rather surprising fact that among older women, even according to the adjusted numbers, fertility declined between 1982 and 1984 but then rose by 1988.
8 Secondary school enrollments rose by more than one-quarter from 25% in 1984 to 32% in 1988. In 1989 the shares of the public budget spent on education and health (20% and 5.5%) were slightly less than in Zimbabwe but government spending accounted for a larger share of GNP (50%).
9 Whereas one-quarter of women between 15 and 49 were age 15-19 according to the 1982 census and the 1988 ZDHS, this age group accounted for only 20% of women in the 1984 ZRHS. The 1987 Intercensal Demographic Survey (Zimbabwe Central Statistics Office 1991) collected information on some 29,000 women age 12 and above; these data should not be subject to end-point problems at 15 or 49. According to the 1987 data, 27% of the 15-49 year-old women were age 15-19. This finding suggests that young women were misclassified in the ZDHS as well.
to This decline is significant in Botswana but not in Zimbabwe.
11 Recall summary data were collected in the 1984 surveys; but summary data and complete birth histories were collected in the 1988 surveys.
12 Because women over 49 were not included in the survey in 1988, ages in 1984 are truncated at 45. 13 Little is known about the reliability of recall data that involve remembering dates (as in the birth histories recorded in 1988). Becker and Mahmud (1984) attempt to validate retrospective birth history data for Matlab by matching them with vital statistics. They find that very few births are missed (around 5%) and that these tend to be non-live births. There is, however, a general tendency for women to place the event too far back. Among women age 30-39, for example, the reported fertility rate for the previous four years was 4% lower than the actual rate when a backward questionnaire was used; for women age 40-49, the reported fertility rate was 6% lower. This evidence would suggest that numbers in the second column of Table 3 should be higher than in the first column. Recall also that the DHS contains some evidence that children age 5 (born in 1983) were misclassified as born before 1983, although this fact should not affect fertility as of 1984 (reported in 1988) .
14 Each woman reports the specific grade she attained as well as the level of schooling (primary, secondary or tertiary). A very small fraction of women reported that they had attended primary school but could not recall the exact grade; we assume that they did not complete primary schooling and, when calculating years of schooling, assume they completed three years at the primary level. Because fewer than 1% of the women failed to report an exact grade, the effect of varying this assumption on our estimates is trivial. The first two years of schooling are labeled preschool; primary school covers the following five years.
15 A nontrivial fraction of the shift in the education distribution for these women occurs at the primary school level (which is usually completed before age 15). This observation suggests that even in this young cohort of women, the 1988 sample is better educated than the 1984 sample.
16 For Zimbabwe, we can compare these estimates with the distribution of education of the same cohorts of women, as recorded in the 1987 Intercensal Demographic Survey (ICDS). Relative to this (large) sample, five-year cohorts of women age 25-49 as of 1984 uniformly report around a fifth of a year less schooling on average in the ZRHS and the difference for this age group is significant. Of course, women under 25 also are better educated in the 1987 survey: for example, women age 15-19 report almost a year more schooling in 1987. Young women in the 1988 ZDHS report significantly more schooling than those in the 1987 survey: women age 15-19 (in 1988 ) report a half-year more schooling in the 1988 survey. This difference is also significant and seems like a very large number for a single year suggesting that perhaps it reflects differences in the samples and not just additional schooling. In 1988, for women age 25-49, educational attainment reported in the 1987 and 1988 surveys are virtually identical (about 4.8 years of schooling); the averages differ by about 0.04 years, half the standard error on the difference (0.08). For these older women, the 1987 ICDS and the 1988 ZDHS education distributions are consistent, although this does not imply that they are necessarily correct.
17 A National Literacy Program (NLP) was established in the late 1970s in Botswana. A 1987 evaluation of the program indicated that it was very successful: 81% of those tested attained literacy levels associated with Standard 4 (UNICEF 1989). Because the questions in the BFHS asked about the highest grade passed (BFHS-I) or completed (BFHS-II) at school, it is unclear whether the NLP should have any impact on reported years of completed schooling in the surveys. Nevertheless, there is evidence for both cohorts of women of a shift from reporting one to three years of schooling to reporting four to five years of schooling. However, since the most substantial shifts in the education distribution are in secondary schooling, the NLP cannot explain much of the cohort-specific differences in education between the two surveys.
18 These simulations are reported only for women age 25-44 because the interpretation for younger women is not clear. 19 To illustrate this procedure, consider women age 25-34. The education specific fertility rates based on the 1984 survey (Table SA) are multiplied by the education distribution in that survey (Table  4 ). The sum of these products, which is reported fertility for these women, is displayed in row 2, column I of Table 5B . Next, take the education distribution for women age 21-30 in 1984 (who would have been 25-34 in 1988) and multiply those numbers by reported education specific fertility rates as reported by 25-34 year old women in the 1988 survey. The sum of those products is an estimate of the fertility this cohort of women would have reported in 1988 had the education distribution remained constant across the two surveys (at the level reported in the 1984 survey). This number is reported in row 2, column 2 of Table 5B . The difference between these numbers is an estimate of fertility decline for this cohort of women, holding the education distribution constant. Comparing this estimate with the decline as reported in the two surveys tells us how much of that reported decline can be explained by the change in the education level of the same cohort of women across the two surveys. The same exercise is repeated using the education distribution in the 1988 survey (row 3) and, for Zimbabwe, the 1987 Intercensal Demographic Survey (row 4). 20 The cell sizes lie between 700 and I, 100 and all of the standard errors are very close to O. I. In a bivariate regression of education on time, the slope is zero for both cohorts of men; for women, the estimated drift is 0.03 years of schooling in each survey year. 21 We are grateful to Chris Paxson, who calculated the numbers underlying the figure. For a description of the data see Deaton and Paxson (1993) and Republic of China (1989) . It is possible that the downward trend reflects in-migration of women from the mainland. 22 Among women age 25-34 in 1984, the average reported education in Mashonaland was 3.9 years in 1984 and 4.4 years in 1988; in Matabeleland, the difference is larger (3.4 to 4.7); in the rest of Zimbabwe the gap is smaller (5.3 to 5.7). It would be imprudent to make much of these interregional differences because they are based on small samples and because the standard errors are quite large about 0.4 for Matabeleland and 0.15 for the other two regions. 23 Experience from other surveys suggests there is some evidence that when enumerators "randomly" pick households in a community, they are least likely to visit the poorest. 24 This difference is significant for women with some primary education. 25 This is significant for women who completed Form 2. 26 There is evidence that women (or enumerators) tended to classify children age 5 at the time of the survey as older (presumably to avoid having to complete the child module of the survey). It is not clear why better-educated women would have reported children who were more than four years old in 1988 as younger than that age. 27 For example, women with at least Form 2 education had 3.1 children fewer than women with no education in 1984, but only 1.8 children fewer in 1988. 28 This is the case for all except those with preschool education in the 25-34 age group, although that difference certainly is not significant.
